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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
SILER, Circuit Judge 
Michael Palardy, a retired police officer of Township 
of Millburn, New Jersey, alleges that the Township’s business 
administrator, Timothy Gordon, unlawfully prevented him 
from becoming Chief of Police because Gordon opposed 
Palardy’s union membership and activity.  The district court 
held Palardy’s union-related speech and association were not 
constitutionally protected and granted summary judgment in 
favor of the Township and Gordon on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
First Amendment retaliation claims.  We agree with Palardy 
that the district court should have analyzed his speech and 
association claims separately and that his association with the 
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union deserves constitutional protection.  However, Palardy’s 
speech claim must fail because it is indistinguishable from his 
associational claim.  Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in 
part, and remand for further proceedings. 
I. 
Palardy worked as a police officer for the Township 
from 1988 until his retirement in 2014.  During his 
employment, he was promoted three times: first to sergeant in 
1995, then to lieutenant in 1998, and finally to captain in 
2012. 
Palardy was also active in the police officers’ unions—
first the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (PBA), and then 
the Superior Officers’ Association (SOA).  In 1991 or 1992, 
Palardy served as the PBA’s sergeant-at-arms.  He was also a 
union delegate from 1992 to 1995.  Later in his career, 
Palardy became more involved in union leadership.  He 
served as the SOA’s vice president in 2007 or 2008, and as its 
president in 2009 or 2010.  During his employment, Palardy 
estimates that he participated in four or five contract 
negotiations between the unions and the Township.  He also 
attended at least two disciplinary hearings for fellow officers. 
Gordon was the Township’s business administrator 
during Palardy’s entire employment.  Among other duties, he 
was responsible for the Township’s personnel matters and 
had the authority to hire, fire, and promote Township 
employees, including police officers.  According to Palardy, 
Gordon repeatedly stymied Palardy’s attempts to become 
Chief of Police.  Palardy testified that other officers told him 
Gordon repeatedly made statements reflecting negatively on 
Palardy’s union activity.  For instance, Gordon told officer 
Robert Brown that Palardy would never become chief 
“because of his union affiliation and being a thorn in my side 
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for all these years.”  Gino Baldani said that Gordon told him 
Palardy “wasn’t a good supervisor . . . because [he] was too 
close to [his] men and [he] would have problems separating 
[his] union business with police department work and being a 
supervisor.”  And Gordon told former chief Paul 
Boegershausen that Palardy “ha[d] to learn how to separate 
[him]self from the rank and file.” 
The events relevant to this case began in late 2010, 
when the Township was without a chief or a team of captains.  
By then, Palardy was the department’s most senior lieutenant 
and was next in line to become a captain.  The Township’s 
custom during this time was to select its new chief from its 
roster of captains; during Gordon’s tenure, there had never 
been an exception to this rule.  Because Palardy was a 
lieutenant, he was not eligible to immediately become chief.  
However, Palardy believed that he could have been promoted 
to captain for a short time and then promoted to chief.  
According to Palardy, this is precisely what happened shortly 
after his retirement: Palardy testified that, as of September 
2016, the acting chief had only been a captain for a few 
months prior to his promotion. 
On this occasion, though, Gordon told Palardy and 
another lieutenant that he did not believe any of the 
lieutenants had enough experience to become chief, and that 
he was considering having the Chief of Police from nearby 
Livingston, New Jersey, serve in a dual capacity as the chief 
of both towns.  That plan did not come to fruition because 
Gregory Weber, a Millburn captain who had been on inactive 
duty for health reasons, returned to active duty and was 
promoted to chief in September 2011.  Weber then gave 
Palardy the title of “acting captain,” which came with 
additional responsibilities but no pay increase.  Around this 
time, Palardy stepped down as union president because he 
“knew Mr. Gordon had a problem with [his] union affiliation” 
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and he wanted “to get the stigma off . . . [himself] that [he] 
was only a union guy.”  Palardy believed that, if he gave up 
his union presidency, it would increase his chances to receive 
an official promotion to captain. 
In October 2011, Gordon retained a consultant to study 
the police department’s “rank structure and current 
vacancies.”  Gordon admitted that the study “could have” 
resulted in the rank of captain being eliminated.  However, 
the consultant recommended that the department retain the 
captain rank and fill the existing vacancies in that position.  
To that end, Gordon promoted Palardy to captain in February 
2012—according to Palardy, “out of desperation.” 
Chief Weber was scheduled to retire in April 2015.  In 
the summer of 2013, Palardy was offered a part-time position 
as Security Coordinator for the Township’s Board of 
Education.  He says he “saw the writing on the wall that he 
would never become chief,” so he decided to retire from the 
police department and accept the school board’s job offer.  
Beginning on September 1, 2013, Palardy was on terminal 
leave, and he retired effective February 1, 2014. 
Palardy then filed suit against the Township and 
Gordon.  His amended complaint asserted eight claims.  The 
district court granted Defendants’ motion for judgment on the 
pleadings as to five of the eight counts, but allowed his state 
and federal constitutional free speech and association claims 
to proceed to discovery.  Defendants then moved for 
summary judgment on Palardy’s remaining claims. 
The court granted Defendants’ motion, holding 
Palardy’s union-related activity was not constitutionally 
protected.  Analyzing his speech and association claims 
together, the court concluded Palardy neither acted as a 
private citizen nor spoke out on a matter of public concern, as 
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required by Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).  This 
appeal followed. 
II. 
This Court “exercise[s] plenary review over a grant of 
summary judgment and appl[ies] the same standard the 
district court applies.”  Migliaro v. Fid. Nat’l Indem. Ins. Co., 
880 F.3d 660, 664 n.6 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).  
“Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.”  Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). 
The Free Speech Clause contained within the New 
Jersey Constitution “is generally interpreted as co-extensive 
with the First Amendment,” so the analysis of Palardy’s state 
free speech claim is identical to its federal counterpart.  Twp. 
of Pennsawaken v. Schad, 733 A.2d 1159, 1169 (N.J. 1999). 
III. 
A. 
To prevail on a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation 
claim, the plaintiff must prove that (1) he engaged in 
“constitutionally protected conduct,” (2) the defendant 
engaged in “retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of 
ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights,” 
and (3) “a causal link [existed] between the constitutionally 
protected conduct and the retaliatory action.”  Thomas v. 
Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation 
omitted).  Here, the District Court held that Palardy’s First 
Amendment claims faltered at the first step because he failed 
to show that his association with, and speech on behalf of, the 
police officers’ union was protected conduct. 
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Not all First Amendment activity is constitutionally 
protected in the public workplace.  “When a citizen enters 
government service, the citizen by necessity must accept 
certain limitations on his or her freedom.”  Garcetti, 547 U.S. 
at 418 (citation omitted).  Insofar as workplace speech is 
concerned, the Supreme Court has long held that public 
employees only receive First Amendment protection from 
retaliation in the workplace when they speak out on a matter 
of public concern and their interest in speaking outweighs the 
government’s interest in promoting workplace efficiency and 
avoiding disruption.  See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 
147 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 
(1968).  In Garcetti, the Court added a further wrinkle to its 
workplace speech jurisprudence, holding that “when public 
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, 
the employees are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate 
their communications from employer discipline.”  Garcetti, 
547 U.S. at 421.  Following Garcetti, then, “[a] public 
employee’s statement is protected activity when (1) in 
making it, the employee spoke as a citizen, (2) the statement 
involved a matter of public concern, and (3) the government 
employer did not have ‘an adequate justification for treating 
the employee differently from any other member of the 
general public.’”  Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 255, 
241-42 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418). 
Although Pickering, Connick, and Garcetti were cases 
about speech, some circuits apply the same rubric to cases 
involving the associational rights of public employees.  This 
is especially true when an employee’s freedom of association 
claim “implicate[s] associational rights in essentially the same 
way and to the same degree” as his free speech claim.  
Sanguigni v. Pittsburg Bd. of Pub. Educ., 968 F.2d 393, 400 
(3d Cir. 1992) (“We hold . . . that Connick governs [the 
plaintiff’s] freedom of association claim because that claim is 
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based on speech that does not implicate associational rights to 
any significantly greater degree than the employee speech at 
issue in Connick.”).  
Palardy’s case, however, is different.  He claims, in 
part, that Gordon retaliated against him simply because of his 
union membership, and not because of his advocacy on any 
particular issue.  Indeed, the comments he alleges Gordon 
made to other officers—for instance, Palardy was disqualified 
from becoming chief “because of his union affiliation”—
evince hostility toward Palardy solely because of his union 
membership.  Palardy’s complaint presents a pure 
associational claim, so the district court should have analyzed 
Palardy’s speech and association claims separately. 
B. 
Taking Palardy’s freedom of association claim, we 
must first determine whether Palardy engaged in protected 
conduct.  This question, in turn, depends upon whether 
Connick and Garcetti apply to pure associational claims like 
Palardy’s.   
The circuits are split on whether Connick’s public-
concern requirement applies to associational claims, and we 
have not yet taken a position.  See Sanguigni, 968 F.2d at 
400.  The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits apply 
the public concern requirement to public employee 
association claims.  See Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 107 (2d 
Cir. 2004); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 249-
50 (4th Cir. 1999); Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 692 (6th Cir. 
1985); Klug v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 197 F.3d 853, 
857 (7th Cir. 1999).  The reasoning of courts adopting this 
position is exemplified by the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Cobb.  There, the court wrote that, although in Connick “it 
was the plaintiff’s speech that was under examination, the 
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Court’s concern over the proper balance of the efficient 
functioning of the government and the First Amendment 
rights of public employees extended more generally to all 
forms of First Amendment expression, including associational 
activity.”  Cobb, 363 F.3d at 104.  “Because the right of 
association is derivative of the First Amendment rights of free 
speech and peaceful assembly,” the Second Circuit reasoned, 
“it would be anomalous to exempt it from Connick’s public 
concern requirement and thereby accord it an elevated status 
among First Amendment freedoms.”  Id. at 105.  The Sixth 
Circuit in Boals also noted that although Connick and 
Pickering were speech cases, they were in turn based upon 
freedom of association cases.  Boals, 775 F.2d at 692. 
On the other side of the split, the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits hold the public concern requirement does not apply 
to associational claims.  See Boddie v. City of Columbus, 989 
F.2d 745, 749 (5th Cir. 1993); Hatcher v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. & 
Orphanage, 809 F.2d 1546, 1558 (11th Cir. 1987).  The Fifth 
Circuit suggests that no additional proof of public concern is 
necessary because the union activity of public employees “is 
not solely personal and is inevitably of public concern.”  
Boddie, 989 F.2d at 750 (emphasis added).  And the Eleventh 
Circuit in Hatcher fell back upon the Supreme Court’s 
decision in NAACP v. Alabama, “in which Justice Harlan 
wrote for the Court: ‘it is immaterial whether the beliefs 
sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, 
economic, religious or cultural matters . . . [,] state action 
which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to 
associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.’”  Hatcher, 809 
F.2d at 1558 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S 449, 460-
61 (1958)).  Connick, according to the Eleventh Circuit, did 
not mark a retreat from that position.  Id. 
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits both take unique 
approaches.  The Ninth Circuit applies the public concern 
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requirement to “hybrid” free speech and association claims, 
but it has not decided the question for freestanding 
association claims.  See Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691, 698 
(9th Cir. 2005).  The Tenth Circuit generally requires the 
public concern requirement for freedom of association claims, 
see Merrifield v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 654 F.3d 1073, 1083-
84 (10th Cir. 2011), but has rejected the requirement in “the 
specific context of public-employee labor unions,” id. at 1084 
(citing Shrum v. City of Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th 
Cir. 2006)). 
In this specific context—an associational claim arising 
from a public employee’s union affiliation—the minority 
position followed by the Fifth Circuit is the better one.  Even 
courts in the majority recognize that at least some union 
speech and activity touch upon matters of public concern.  
See, e.g., Boals, 775 F.2d at 693.  It follows, then, that a 
public employee’s membership in a union might also be a 
matter of public concern.  But how are courts to distinguish 
between union membership that implicates a public concern, 
and union membership that does not? 
Where speech is concerned, the test is easy: “Personal 
grievances, complaints about conditions of employment, or 
expressions about other matters of personal interest . . . are 
matters more immediately concerned with the self-interest of 
the speaker as employee.”  Id. (quoting Campbell v. 
Galloway, 483 F.3d 258, 267 (4th Cir. 2007)).  But union-
related speech is different than mere union membership.  
Because labor unions advocate for their employees on a wide 
range of issues, the number of possible subjects for union-
related speech is similarly wide-ranging.  Conversely, union 
membership is a dichotomy—either an employee is a union 
member, or he is not.  As Seventh Circuit Judge Cudahy 
recognized, the test used to determine whether speech 
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implicates a matter of public concern does not square with 
this dichotomy: 
[T]he Pickering/Connick test is cumbersome in 
the context of a pure association claim.  Under 
Connick, whether an employee’s speech touches 
on a matter of public concern is determined by 
an analysis of the “content, form, and context of 
a given statement.”  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 
138, 147-48, (1983).  This analysis is applied 
easily to the hybrid cases cited by the majority.  
In Griffin v. Thomas, for instance, an assistant 
principal alleged that her employer retaliated 
against her for filing a grievance through the 
Chicago Teachers Union.  See 929 F.2d 1210, 
1210 (7th Cir. 1991).  To determine whether the 
plaintiff's activity touched on a public concern, 
the court was able to review the substance of 
her grievance.  See id. at 1215.  But how does 
one neatly apply the “content, form, and 
context” analysis to a [pure associational] claim 
. . . ? 
 
Balton v. City of Milwaukee, 133 F.3d 1036, 1041 (7th Cir. 
1998) (Cudahy, J., concurring). 
Here, the Township does not provide any justiciable 
basis for us to separate the wheat from the chaff—to 
determine which union association is worthy of First 
Amendment protection and which is not.  By holding that 
mere membership in a public union is always a matter of 
public concern, the Fifth Circuit’s approach avoids this 
problem.  See Boddie, 989 F.2d at 750.  Connick’s public-
concern requirement thus stands as no obstacle to Palardy’s 
associational claim. 
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There is less authority regarding whether Garcetti’s 
private-citizen requirement applies to pure associational 
claims.  The Second Circuit has stated that the issue is 
unclear.  Lynch v. Ackley, 811 F.3d 569, 583 n.15 (2d Cir. 
2016). 
As with Connick’s public-concern requirement, it does 
not make much sense to apply Garcetti’s private-citizen 
requirement to pure associational claims based on union 
membership.  The touchstone of Garcetti is whether the 
public employee was “mak[ing] statements pursuant to [his] 
official duties.”  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.  By the plain 
language of the Court’s opinion, then, Garcetti applies to 
speech, not association. 
Moreover, it is hard to imagine a situation where a 
public employee’s membership in a union would be one of 
his “official duties.”  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.  This is 
especially true in light of Janus v. American Federation of 
State, County, and Municipal Employees, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 
2460 (2018), where the Supreme Court recently held that 
public employees who choose not to join their union cannot 
be compelled to pay agency fees to offset the costs of the 
union’s collective bargaining efforts. 
Labor unions, by their very nature, exist to protect the 
interests of the employees on whose behalf they bargain; job 
duties derive from the needs of the employer.  And in this 
specific case, there is no evidence that Palardy’s membership 
in the police officers’ union was one of his job duties.  To the 
contrary, he alleges he resigned his union presidency because 
he thought it would help further his career.  For these reasons, 
we decline to apply Garcetti’s private-citizen test to Palardy’s 
freedom of association claim. 
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Having established that Connick and Garcetti do not 
bar Palardy’s associational claim, it becomes clear that his 
union membership is worthy of constitutional protection.  
Prior to those cases, the Supreme Court noted that a public 
employee possesses a First Amendment right to associate 
with a union.  See Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emp., 441 
U.S. 463, 465 (1979).  Palardy was a union member and 
leader, and he brought forth at least some evidence suggesting 
Gordon harbored animosity toward him because of his union 
affiliation.  The district court therefore erred by holding as a 
matter of law that Palardy did not establish the first element 
of his First Amendment retaliation claim—constitutionally-
protected conduct. 
Because it found Palardy could not prevail on the first 
element, the court did not consider whether he created a 
genuine issue of material fact on the other two elements of his 
associational claim—whether Defendants engaged in 
“retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary 
firmness from exercising his constitutional rights,” and 
whether “a causal link [existed] between the constitutionally 
protected conduct and the retaliatory action.”  Thomas, 463 
F.3d at 296 (citation omitted).  Defendants do not address 
these elements on appeal, and we do not believe the evidence 
is so one-sided as to require summary judgment in their favor.  
Thus, we remand to the district court to consider the 
remaining two elements of Palardy’s associational claim. 
C. 
Compared to his associational claim, the analysis of 
Palardy’s speech claim is much more straightforward.  As 
noted earlier, we have dismissed associational claims that we 
viewed as co-extensive with the plaintiff’s free speech claim.  
See Sanguigni, 968 F.2d at 400.  Here, the opposite is true—
Palardy’s free speech claim is co-extensive with his 
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associational claim.  He does not allege that Gordon retaliated 
against him because of his speech or advocacy on any 
particular issue.  He simply claims that Gordon prevented him 
from becoming chief because he was a union man.  Because 
Palardy did not adequately plead a freestanding speech claim, 
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on that claim. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in 
part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
